INTRODUCTION
anthropology is a theory and an approach which has not iered or used in political science research. This paper in-on of this structural anthropological approach, one which many of its metaphysical assumptions, this paper identwo binary oppositions at the level of the political is not to learn about the formal universals of the human learn about these two political oppositions and their relapolitics. Deep structure is of interest when we move from Is to the social-psychological and substantive univern understanding and explaining the surface-level relao social scientists. which follow, two binary oppositions existing in introduced. Relationships between the two are first onal assumptions. These assumptions, however, are t with available scholarly evidence. A better explanabetween the oppositions is then presented along with ly, after arguing that one structural explanation ns, extensions to other surface-level phenomena are hat structural anthropology provides a useful approach relationships between several literatures rarely considered n fact inexorably related and beneficially combined. thesized relationships among several data sets are n, provide the first systematic evidence of several
AND FOREIGN OPPOSITIONS
oppositions considered here are the distinctions bebetween two categories of public policy. In sum, t and can be cor a 'boundary' ar cept as it is us( distinction is fa find that even \ out group categ also Billig and counter-intuitik discrimination distinctiveness. I of losing their
The secon between the An tisan approach politics out of fc discussion. "Pol Johnson, 1975) . of foreign polic:
bipartisanship. :
foreign and don exist and is clea
There is a 1 explain the exisi distinctions. For from several disc sion under certa s of local (city, county, town, etc.) governments. For exam~tity" is defined by Tajfel (1982: 24) as "that part of the inncept which derives from their knowledge of. . . membership ~p .
. .together with the value and emotional significance of 1." For officeholders social identity refers directly to their ion. le Republican/Democratic distinction is clear enough to give meanings, the boundary between the two is not well de-)lit-ticket voting, "roll-off," and "drop-off' (Burnham, 1970) )portion of the electorate identifying with a political party lete; of those who do identify with a political party, variable accord with their party (Crotty and Jacobson, 1980) ; party iolatile, as are aggregate election returns; legislators rarely lembership as the sole cue for voting decisions (Clausen, he ideological distinctiveness of aspects of the parties seem boundary between the parties is crossed easily and often, dered "loose" [see Leach (1976: 33-36 ) for a definition of Merelman (1984) for examples and definitions of the conhere]. But even though the boundary is looser, the party rom being lost. In the general case, Allen and Wilder (1975) en group beliefs are similar, the minimal process of in and :ization is enough to make in group favoritism persist (see ijfel, 1973; Sole et al., 1975) . In fact, there is even some evidence that when groups have similar values, intergroup actually heightened-plausibly in order to protect group , party boundaries are weakening but do not seem in danger :aning . binary opposition to be considered here is the distinction .ican "bipartisan" approach to foreign policy and the pardomestic policies. It is an often stated aspiration to keep :ign policy, in both congressional deliberations and public cs stops at the water's edge," it is often written (Bliss and 'his distinction guarantees that even when politics is part iecisions, it is usually within the rhetorical constraints of e boundary between the way citizens and leaders deal with tic policies may not be as strong as it once was, but it does I relevant. ge body of social-psychological work which may partially Ice of these oppositions in terms of in group/out group ample, Stein (1976) finds in a review of empirical literature lines that inter-group "conflict does increase internal coheconditions." Tajfel(1982) unong others, Freud and early frustration-aggression theorists. nces of in group/out group conflict for which Tajfel cites e the increased "positive evaluation of the ingroup or its pro-)emocratic/Republican opposition, the most pronounced titudinal distinctions are likely to occur when the parties try atus and power of each other (Brown and Ross, 1982) . Rele-)f accentuated party distinctiveness, out group discrimina-:ened levels of inter-party verbal combat include legislative ich the president or other leaders of the parties have their ake, electoral campaigns in which there is an attack on the f the opposition group, and in debates in which the parties ntal principles on which the opposition makes its case. aradox of these two oppositions is that the same political w h e d apart by the party opposition are pulled together on atters. We will see that for party leaders, these cross-pressures One of the contributions of this paper, therefore, is to sugk for understanding this problem.
OPPOSITION SIMILARITIES
Uy, these two oppositions have been treated separately or as lated; after all, they are prima facie different phenomena. usefully studied together? Are the two binary oppositions hey are, what form does the relationship take? Guided by ternative answers to these questions are now explored. itional and clearly plausible connection is that referred to )b (1957: 198) , and mentioned by many others: "The two s that normally may be expected to favor the achievement 'peration in foreign affairs are the nonideological nature ties and the absence of strict party discipline in congress." when there is less partisanship (i.e., weak boundaries be-), bipartisanship in foreign policy is easier to achieve. The : when the definitional, attitudinal, and behavioral bounRepublican and the Democratic parties breaks down, the I foreign policy bipartisanship and domestic policy partisanlter and less permeable; that is, partisan politics would be i the boundary and infect foreign policy decision-making. Crabb refers to the loose party boundary by its nature emphasizes that this cultural code is very different ided codes, such as ideology or religion. this statement of the relationship between the two opposi-:ally reasonable, it is not supported by a variety of evidence. contradictory historical and cross-sectional examples. >ugh there is considerable evidence that American political ming more permeable, loose, and porous (Crotty and Jacobe is also evidence-or at least widespread expert opinionllitics are increasingly infecting the foreign policy arena. As ier Chace (1978) as representative of scholarly, journalistic, on: "The kind of broad consensus that obtained during the . which became a shibboleth of American foreign policy may ~ssible short of war." : with this is a dramatic increase in suggestions of how to ~gn-bipartisan/domestic-partisan boundary. These proposals : ad hoc bipartisan groups in congress to follow important ssues (Hamilton, 1978) , increasing congressional expertise I, establishing committees of the president's cabinet and ngress (Manning, 1977) , increasing politically responsible America's leaders (Bax, 1977) , and having the president act lould encourage party leaders in congress to work more close-)reign policy issues (Frye and Rogers, 1979) . Of course, direct ses would be better evidence of this point, but none exist.4
, in this historical example, the strength of the boundary in 3 binary oppositions seemed to vary together-loosely dees between foreign and domestic politics being more likely loosely defined parties. The initial hypothesis of an inverse hough consistent with conventional wisdom, is not supported ~mple. td example, consider two types of people generally distinguishiomic levels (with education weighted heavily in the distinc-.lyses have shown political parties to be more salient to those S groups; these groups are more polarized along partisan lines kely to identify with, and be active in, a political party than IPS (Ladd and Lipset, 1971; Ladd with Hadley, 1978) . upper SES groups are also more likely to support a bipariicy and to prefer bipartisan foreign policies. ly the president. Mueller's survey analyses clearly show that ps have higher proportions of "followers." 1 somewhat contradictory that those in upper SES groups rtisan and more likely to be "followers," particularly since .h on which they are following the leader may not be conelatively strong partisan predispositions. However, someone manding of the differences between the parties is likely en this boundary should be breached, and would therefore support such an action under appropriate circumstances. his second example, for those groups in which the matic boundary is tight, the bipartisan foreign policy/paricy boundary is also tight. This is additional evidence against thesis; the oppositions do seem to vary together. :xample, consider the differences between members and )use of Representatives. Since leadership in the House is ie political party distinctions, it is a safe assumption that Iemocratic boundary is tighter for the leaders than the estion then concerns the salience of the other opposition ps; the proposition above indicates that this boundary is nbers, while the two previous examples suggest the reverse. is latter possibility-that the porousness of the matic boundary varies in the same direction as the policy boundary -would provide the first systematic bipartisan foreign policy" hypothesis, in this paper or in 11 data from the first session (for comparability) of each iential election congresses (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) , this question can icluding those votes on which the president took a public :ressional Quarterly) and using the representative's vote as s, those roll calls in which a larger proportion of represeneighted more heavily. Although some representatives might 11 ("important") votes, a cursory examination of roll calls veighting is generally in accord with conceptual importance. xoblem with the analysis is the clustering of observations and by roll call, possibly causing an underestimation of ;. However, because the data set is so large (154,709 voting the standard errors are very small, and a correction is y to change this appre~iably.~ Also, since many decisions lcluded long before or entirely without a formal roll call, cross-sectional design, heteroskedasticity would produce inefficient and analysis of the residuals, however, indicates no major problems.
I
King tion bias (see Barnow et al., 1980 wore often than Out party members (the lower line). But cates that except for defense policy -which could plausibly 'ietnam becoming more of a domestic than a foreign policy midentally, supports the first example, above)-there is a e in leadership support for the president: In foreign policy, F an In party congressional leader supporting the president ~tage points more than Out party leaders (excluding defense). it in party leadership support for the president is about twice Ir domestic policy categories. Thus, among the party leaderlear difference, a very tight boundary, between politics in which tends to be bipartisan-and politics in domestic nds to be partisan. This is witnessed by the clear distinction and right sides of the figure. I presentation, Figure 2 lip. For example, on voting for foreign aid decisions there ge no In and Out party difference in the probability of a voting with the president. In contrast, in the government ~tegory, In party members are about ten points more likely : president than Out party members. But although the difhe correct direction, the boundaries are nowhere near as tight leaders represented in Figure 1 .
is example, as in the previous two, the two binary opposiry together: When the Republican/Democratic boundary is le party leaders), the Foreign-Bipartisan/Domestic-Partisan ) tight. When there are somewhat weaker party distinctions embers), there are also looser distinctions between types of m or partisan) in different policy areas (foreign or domestic).
In alternative explanation is needed.
TWO BINARY OPPOSITIONS -ONE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE
proposition was that the two codes varied inversely: When etween one was tight the other should be loose. This though not extensively explored in the literature-was sup~ble argument and conventional political science wisdom. It ients in scholarly articles and as a "well known fact" in many ever, empirical evidence from three examples demonstrated bably not the case. Rather, the boundaries between the codes ogether -when one code was loose, the other code was loose 'es us with evidence of a relationship but with no explanation. derive an explanation, it is important to recognize that im-:ussion thus far is that each of these binary oppositions is phoric symbol for the other. It was implied that the opposi-:ther or apart or that one caused the other. An alternative d the basis for the explanation to be offered, is that the two netonyrnic; they are contiguous to each other. In other words, lsition is a structural transformation of the other: One funu e underlies both distinctions. on structural basis for these two codes is the distinction be-'they" (or, more generally, between "same" and "different;" sed because they have more direct relevance to the surface1s of interest). The concept of "we" does not have meaning ~g concept of "they" is contrasted and defined. This distinc-:d in many areas: For example, David Truman's "Wave :st group formation is based on this distinction: "Organizaterorganization," he writes (Truman, 1956) . Implied is that ma1 organization, the counterorganization would not have i group (as "we") without the first group forming (and iden-: S as "we" and everyone else as "they"). rinciple can be applied to Middle Eastern politics: Concomiirp increase in immigration of Jews to Palestine earlier in their self-identification as "we," and others as "they," was n of the Arabs living in the area as "we," and the Jews as 1978); efforts at linguistic distinctiveness also increased )d (Seckback, 1974) . War, for example, could not exist :hey opposition. ~f course, many political phenomena which do not derive listinction, as when political action is based on a sense of msensus. In the first presidential elections, for example, emphasized that the political party to whom the speaker wesented, or in fact actually was, the will of the nation. 1976 "National Unity Party," and Reagan's 1984 appeal ~tism" are more recent examples.
Democratic/Republican opposition can be reformulated r as "my party/other party," and the Foreignstic-Partisan binary opposition can also be viewed as redefining th ties, it is be1 of the world; level (or cor structural 01
Thus fz an underlyin although dee entirely an ir that is more therefore be is this struct~
The bar ties lead to th operation of ( e/they distinction. Instead of the division being between par-:n the U.S. and the world (or between the U.S. and parts -om this perspective, these two oppositions are really surfacet) manifestations or transformations of the same we/they iition.
relationship -the binary oppositions varying together -and planation-a structural identity -have been assembled. But ructure is of academic and exploratory interest (and remains ence), it is the political content as presently conceptualized e n of interest to political scientists. These findings must ted back to the original substantive problem.Vn sum, why relationship of interest? )brewation is that strong and clearly defined political paripartisan operation of foreign policy and the usual partisan ~estic policy. The explanation follows directly: With "strong" ith a strong we/they opposition, there is the possibility of tween the party leaders; the leaders can speak more conparty members and can make compromises with opposi-: more easily.' Furthermore, bipartisanship (i.e., interparty s t likely when the issue defines the we/they opposition as versus other nations; of course, bipartisanship is possible B, but it seems likely to be most frequent in foreign policy. well-defined Republican/Democratic distinction leads to i between foreign policy bipartisanship and domestic policy ed on systematic evidence, this effectively redefines the policy hypothesis.
STRUCTURAL EXTENSIONS
umerous (surface-level) manifestations of the structural position. Examples from Truman's wave theory of interest ind from Middle Eastern politics have already been proes of other applications could be explicated in considerable shon examples, consider: Explanations of social group nts for the psychological and sociological necessity of the ve been satisfied here, but for present purposes. I concentrate on using gy to understand the surface-level phenomena of primary interest to circumstances when inter-group competition does not lead to in group 982: 16); Rabbi, and deBrey (1971) ; Rabbie and Wilkens (1971) ates; understanding ethnocentricity and racism; exploraof the nation-state; explanations of the development of the oyalty for certain products which some advertising creates; s and loyalty to certain teams (which are not coincidently )ducts and cities); and the tremendous appeal of the Olymn network titles some events as "The U.S. verses The ~l d be extended. Instead, the approach suggested by this d in this paper is limited to examining one political issue inal two binary oppositions. ace level manifestation of the we/they binary opposition rivalry between congress and the presidency in the conicy. This binary opposition suggests that in foreign policy e likely to cross the opposition boundary to support the :stic policy, however, the congress/presidency boundary ent and support for the president should drop. :ty, policy, and institutional oppositions on the level of have been identified. All three seem to be related to the )logical structure. Crabb (1957: 7) describes some of the :n these:
blems-relations between the parties and relations between the extive branches-are intimately connected, only confusion can result em as identical problems. Harmony may prevail between the two nment concerned with foreign affairs; but this fact alone will not ,an co-operation in the foreign policy realm. (Crabb, 1957: 7) of boundaries between the House and the presidency is d by Polsby (1968) . An institutionalized organization he c "relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated mt." An increase in this boundedness or institutionalizamrved by a decrease in the turnover of members, increase $h of service, increase in the seniority of successful can-:r, and sharp decline of lateral career movement, in and nd, in some notable cases, also in and out of the speakeras been, over time, a clearer we/they distinction between ,residency. lclusion above that the strength of the boundaries vary on, the stronger boundary between congress and its enus between congress and the presidency, should lead to d i t y of agreement between the two branches of governnt should be most apparent in foreign affairs -where the )n is reformulated to provide incentive for congresconsensus. oted that the congress/presidency distinction is an instituherea as the others are cognitive or social oppositions. In order 1 the data analyz are presented fc as a consequen dent, both the le than on domesti tion observed a than the follow Figure 3 r c probability of tt policy areas. It SI leadership decis of the president striking: The prc the president ap ICY opposition probably originated on the basis of cognitive ant to the founders, but this institutional distinction, once ly encouraged and exaggerated the we/they cognitive opstinction blurs when considering political parties which, formal part of American government, have been insituts inception. le congressional/presidential boundary is clearly becoming M8), it is not apparent from the literature whether in foreign eesulted in the predicted increase in agreement between 'ess and the president. What is often called the two presidenied on the hypothesis by Wildavsky (1966)J is far from conthe level or the trend of congressional support for the i m versus domestic affairs. In fact, even given the plausiky makes for it, there exists no satisfactory systematic ypothesis. (It is interesting that published work in the two lipartisan foreign policy literatures rarely cite each other h e r s work. The structuralist approach employed here helps tion.) , LeLoup and Shull(1979) update Wildavsky's analysis and port for his thesis that congressional support for the presi-'oreign than on domestic affairs but find that the relationg in recent years. The problem with this analysis, and with la1 article, is that their measure of support is no longer r Congressional Quarterly because of what CQ calls its ' Lee Sigelman (1979) uses a different measure and finds trence between foreign and domestic support. For potential Sigelman study see LeLoup and Shull (1980) . lrovide a more systematic examination of this question, in Figures 1 and 2 can be examined further. Again data 1e members and the party leaders. The hypothesis is that )f the tight boundaries between congress and the presirs and members will support the president more on foreign Tain roll calls. Furthermore, from the effects of stratificae, the relationship should be stronger among the leaders rts predicted values of a logistic equation explaining the arty leader voting with the president for each of the seven s t s that, with defense policy as a possible exception again, ; on foreign affairs are far more likely to be supportive n are decisions on domestic affairs. The difference is also lility of a congressional leader of either party voting with aches certainty for foreign affairs but remains a full 25 lower for domestic policy decisions. Support for the presihigher in foreign trade than foreign aid, and there is some ort among the domestic policies, but, again except for ary distinction is between foreign and domestic policies. g party leaders in the House, the two presidencies thesis With foreign policy comes a greater probability of leaderith the incumbent president. {ides a parallel analysis for the general membership of the trent, the probability of a representative voting with the xtantially different between foreign and domestic affairs. :st support for the president is in a foreign policy area le this is consistent with the argument that those higher tification hierarchies tend to support tighter boundaries, 't the present argument. was initially hypothesized from previous examples that cd boundaries between "we" and "they" should result in :ohesion and thus a greater possibility of we/they agree-(in this case foreign policy) issues. For executive-legislative :ralization remains accurate for the party leadership but I membership. Therefore, although the party leadership ructural explanation presented thus far, the members can an exception. planation of this exception can be found in a closer exrical changes in congress. It has already been observed teadily become more bounded from the presidency (and . This trend can easily be seen as resulting, in er presidential involvement in the legislative process (David-1981: 36-9; Wayne, 1978: 8, passim) . In other words, as ecting itself from presidential hegemony, congress has set ocedures which emphasize decision-making decentralization. the probable consequence if congress had become more greater support for the president among the formal party llization would give the leaders more influence, which in bly promote presidential dominance. The current "strategy" I -one of divide or be conquered -preserves congressional Ira Hinckley (1978: 206) provides several important illustrament:
em creates a committee leadership independent of party leaders inent. Specialization in committees and subcommittees can generate mpenetrable to presidential influence. Midterm elections counter dential coattails from the preceding election, cutting back after two :ar term the first full strength of a president's partisan support.
lstitutions and groups mentioned above become very :e of stronger boundaries (e.g., what unites the country war?), clearer boundaries in the we/they distinction have, in the congres jealous of its pc intended or no fluence. That i numbers of the attempt to inf Therefore, the influence in co la1 example, discouraged intra-group cohesion. Always r and position, congress took the logical approach (whether f decentralizing and, as a result, reducing presidential in3ecause there are fewer members who can influence large olleagues, the number of points at which presidents must ice the congress is. . .that much more." (Davis, 1979) .
ilt of stronger boundaries, in this case, is less presidential ess and less institutional agreement.
CONCLUSIONS
ge of structural anthropology, deep structure, in the form iary opposition, seems to have been identified. Several content rather than structural) manifestations have been ined. Reminiscent of ~6vi-~trauss' elaborate contingency nderlying structure in terms of all possible combinations this analysis also found that the translation process from e-level phenomena has not been uniform. itorical changes in, and dynamics of, political parties, idential relations, bipartisanship verses partisanship, and an all be usefully understood within this framework. More 1 analogies between the following have been established: an:Democrat::foreign policy:domestic po1icy::conhen the boundaries between any of these pairs is strong, ,een any other pair is also likely to be strong.
1 has also helped to connect and relate two literatureses" and the "bipartisan foreign policy" literatures -with -references but with numerous substantive and structural baper has demonstrated some of the benefits of considering :s simultaneously. has also led to theoretical justification of and systematic the bipartisan foreign policy and the two presidencies lysis of more than one hundred and fifty thousand voting presidential terms sometimes supports both hypotheses, is substantially stronger among the leaders than among e U.S. House of Representatives. Thus, conventional ~y be based more on this highly visible group-is more rate hypotheses are applied to congressional leaders and as also helped to clarify the unique position of the party :ss -cross-pressured at the intersection of two structural congress/presidency opposition encourages the leaders to and against the president. It suggests that the leaders resist at persuasion and protect congressional prerogative. opposition pushes these leaders in a organizations such as the U.S. coninformation and perhaps a the leaders have ingives the leaders results in far 1
